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International Constitutionalism and the State 
 
International constitutionalization presents a challenge to the traditional 
international legal order and particularly the role of the state. The state is currently 
in a period of flux within international law. Constitutionalization presents one 
possible future understanding of the role of the state in international governance. 
Arguably for a process of constitutionalization to occur some core norms of 
constitutionalism must be present. Two norms of constitutionalism, the separation 
of powers and democratic legitimacy, present particular difficulties for the role of 
the state in current international law. As long as state’s actions as part of an 
international constitutional order remain unresolved, the process of 
constitutionalization itself cannot said to be complete or indeed legitimate. 
 
1. International Constitutionalism and the State 
 
The state dominates the historical narrative of modern international law.1 The 
traditional account establishes that from the signing of the Peace of Westphalia to 
the present, the state, as defined by the terms of recognition (defined territory, 
defined population, control over internal and external relations) and sovereignty are 
the centrifugal force in international law.2 In recent years, the advent of multiple 
international actors requires a reconsideration of this account of the state's place in 
the international legal order.3 Regarding the state as the all encompassing sole 
subject of international law is no longer sound. Alongside this evolution, the 
developing theory of international constitutionalization requires a reflection on the 
operation of the international legal order.4 This paper asks what impact international 
constitutionalization would have upon the state and further whether such a change 
would be advantageous to the international legal order. 
 
Settling the future of the state is not easy. Between suggesting that the state will 
remain the core subject and object of international law and the dismantling the state 
as the crux of the international legal order is the argument that the state is instead in 
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2 
 
a period of transformation.5 This midway stance argues that the position of the state 
is at a point of flux and this turbulence may lead to the establishment of a legal order 
in which the hitherto objects of international law, international organisations and 
individuals, among others, are, like states, subjects of international law.6 While the 
degree to which this transformation is occurring is not the focus of this piece, the 
recognition of a shift in the fundamental parameters of international law 
necessitates consideration of the possible shape of a future international legal order. 
If the transformation is to be constitutional, how the state will and should fit into 
this new system needs careful consideration. This is an important question as it 
focuses on the core of how the international legal order has up to the present 
operated and asserts that describing international law through the action of states 
alone is unfeasible.  
 
Contributing to the volatility in accounts of the role of the state is the wavering 
boundaries between international and domestic law that no longer, if indeed they 
ever were, easy to maintain.7 This is coupled with the role of regional legal orders 
which establish new layers of governance.8 The extent of the states' remit within 
international law and the debate on the ‘crisis of territoriality’ and its consequences 
is linked to the rise of regional orders.9 In accounting for the operation of 
international governance, the more traditional accounts of international law lead to 
a fissure. Consequently, a more complex account of the international legal order 
with the state as one of a number of international actors must be intertwined with 
the recognition of the workings of other legal orders.10 This necessitates a revisit of 
the perceived wisdoms of international law, and one method of doing so is to 
consider what impact a constitutionalization process may have upon the role of the 
state in international law. 
 
Habermas points to the gap between the actuality of governance beyond the state 
and the procedures which have served nation states as the sole subjects of 
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international law.11 This flux or transformation may require a re-imagining of the role 
of the state. This re-imagining may be coupled with a perceptive change within 
international law towards a more constitutional rationale. This article seeks to 
discuss the international constitutionalization debate within international law and 
consider the impact that constitutionalism would have on the role of the state. While 
this article does not seek to empirically prove that constitutionalization is occurring it 
does proceed on the basis that changes are occurring within the international legal 
order which could be rightly described as nascent constitutionalism. This article 
seeks to understand the consequences of a constitutionalization process upon the 
state. This piece begins with three conceptions of the state in international law, this 
is followed by a discussion of the international constitutionalization debate, asking 
whether constitutionalization solely inhabits the state or may legitimately be 
considered beyond this confine and further, enquires as to the elemental norms of a 
constitutional order. The second half of the article examines two constitutional 
norms, separation of powers and democratic legitimacy, to decipher what impact 
international constitutionalization may have upon the state.  
2. The State in International Law  
 
The state is at the core of international, regional and domestic law. The differing 
roles the state plays within the three legal systems is without compare and while it 
fulfils varying roles in each legal order, the state remains central to understanding 
how each system works. The impact which the state as a legal entity has had on 
international law should not be underestimated. 
 
Yet, from this traditional basis international law, centred on state consent, is giving 
way to a more differentiated legal order. The models of multilateralism, the 
establishment of doctrines such as jus cogens, among other changes, produces a 
network of laws which can no longer be described as purely consensual.12 Further, 
the establishment and proliferation of multilateral organisations changes the 
features of international law and calls traditional aspects of sovereignty into 
question.13 Various theories, including fragmentation,14 global legal pluralism15 and 
constitutionalization seek to rationalise these changes into a coherent theory to 
account for this transformation in international law. 
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Three differing explanations of the place of the state in international law underpin 
these changes: the Westphalian state, the modern state, and the end of the state as 
the core legal actor. The first, the classical Westphalia tradition, places the state as 
the sole subject and at the centre of international law. As the solitary subjects of 
international law, states possess the sole law-making power. Any other law 
formation bodies, such as international organisations, are mere avatars of states 
and, as such, enjoy their ability to form law as part of the delegation of power from 
the state. Other rules of international law, particularly erga omnes and jus cogens, 
do limit state action, but only to the extent that the international community of 
states is developing these norms as part of international law.16 
 
Arguably sovereignty has, though this varies across the development of international 
law, a core meaning which focuses on the supreme authority within a territory.17 
Sovereignty, as embodied in the state, is central to understanding this traditional 
perspective. The strict Westphalia position is buttressed by a narrow reading of 
Article 2.1 of the UN Charter which places sovereign equality at the heart of 
international governance and law-making.18 As such, international law and 
sovereignty are reliant upon each other. Sovereignty does not exist without the state 
and as such any purported international constitutional law is entwined with 
statehood.19 States and sovereignty are mutually reliant.  
 
The second stance suggests that the traditional view of international law, as just 
described, is often overvalued.20 Instead, what should be paramount is a modern 
notion of political authority linked to questions of legitimate governance and law 
formation. According to Sarooshi, questions of power allocation traditionally reside 
within the monopoly by government of decision making power.21 Yet, over time this 
monopoly is slowly eroding. The exact timing of this erosion is open to debate. Some 
highlight the commencement of multilateralism and the creation of the League of 
Nations, others focus on the establishment of the UN, still others propose that is at 
the end of 1970s when states past through a golden age towards a gradual reduction 
of their power,22 and yet others argue that is the advent of globalisation, the 
movement of capital and the emergence of several failed states23 that has turned us 
into, in the words of Malanczuk, ‘new medievalists.’24 Intriguingly, neo-medievalism 
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harks back to the pre-Westphalia era, when states were not the focus of 
international law, yet sovereignty as embodied by an individual, usually a monarch, 
was a central aspect of the legal order.25 According to Raustiala, with fluid borders, 
more interdependence and technical advancement, traditional sovereignty can no 
longer be achieved.26 This unlocks questions regarding the more traditional accounts 
of international law which bind the state to sovereignty. 
 
The changing status of the state compels a reconsideration of both the state and 
sovereignty. Allott recognises the importance of states, but not in the absolutist 
fashion advocated by others. While not declaring an end to sovereignty, Allott 
regards change to be underway in the relationship between the state and 
international law.27 Alternatively, Tomuschat supports a more cautious approach 
suggesting that the emergence of non-state actors in international law is an aspect 
of a change in the subjects of international law as a facet of the evolution of an 
international community but not a root and branch revolution. For Tomuschat states 
must act to the betterment of all humans within their jurisdiction and accordingly 
rules have emerged, driven from the constitutional principle of the common values 
of mankind, to substantiate this obligation.28 The state ensures compliance with 
these laws and the state takes action against those who do not. This is not to 
discount other actors’ involvement but to acknowledge that the states retain this key 
protagonist.  
 
An alternate argument suggests a move away from the monopolisation of 
international law by the state. This movement, Habermas argues, is not only an 
important historical factor but one that is central to understanding the present 
constitutionalization of international law.29 This shift does not displace the state 
within international law but rather recognises that the more traditional or classical 
interpretations of international law no longer serve to describe the law or the 
position of states.  
 
By contrast, very few scholars advocate the third option, the emergence of a 
completely stateless international order.30 Discussion of stateless international law 
should be set apart from debates on state-reform that focuses upon the 
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transformation of state structures within global governance.31 There are several 
variations of the stateless argument. One focuses on the rise of international and 
supranational organisations, non-governmental organisations, corporations, the 
changes brought about in international trade law and the increasing remit of human 
rights meaning that states' centrality to the international legal order will diminish to 
a point of dénouement. State extinction remains reliant on particular outcomes such 
as the creation of a multitude of supranational organisations, mirroring the EU, that 
continue well beyond that organisation's current plans, a trend which has yet to be 
substantiated.32  
 
Another variation on the stateless world takes a normative approach. Due to its 
overtly negative impact upon both law and society the state, as both a basis of 
sovereignty and nationhood within international law, should come to an end.33 Yet, 
even as states morph into alternate and altered roles, they remain steadfast in the 
landscape of international law.34 Indeed, while it would seem outlandish to propose 
either that states remain the sole makers of international law or that they will cease 
to part of a composite international legal order the necessity of considering their 
impact both as a historical fact and as basis of legal transformation remains 
imperative thus making the stateless narrative superfluous to the 
constitutionalization debate.35 
 
Nonetheless, in recognising that states remain part of the international legal order, 
however reduced their place, certain deficiencies appear in descriptions of 
international law. The issues of integrating other subjects of international law into 
the system or how a structure of governance will be incorporated into a revised legal 
order remain unanswered. This brings us to the potential place of 
constitutionalization in modern international legal order. While the identification of 
a move away from a statist regime is not always present in international 
constitutionalization theories, for some, the state is becoming less the focus of the 
legal order as the international community, regional organisations or international 
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organisations taking centre stage.36 If the international legal order is in a process of 
re-ordering into a constitutionalised system, the role of the state must adapt to the 
constitutional norms which are core to this constitutional order.37 
3. International Constitutionalization 
 
Before discussing the impact of constitutionalization on the state, the first point to 
consider is constitutionalization and constitutionalism as legal concepts.38 The range 
of uses of constitutionalization and constitutionalism makes an abridgment of their 
content unfeasible.39 As such, this article does not account for the entire debate. 
After a brief discussion of the international constitutionalization debate as it stands, 
this section will focus on understanding the interaction between 
constitutionalization and the state. This will centre upon norms of constitutionalism 
and what changes they require of the state in a constitutionalization process.  
 
Constitutionalism, as a theory of governance, requires a system of law to comprise 
core norms such as the rule of law, rules which constrain individual freedoms to tests 
of proportionality and necessity, separation of powers, rule orientated settlement of 
disputes, and inalienable human rights regimes.40 Yet, there are competing views of 
what international constitutionalism entails. For Walker it is an ‘indispensable 
symbolic and normative framework for thinking about the problems of viable and 
legitimate regulation of the complexly overlapping political communities of a post-
Westphalia world.’41 Roth argues that a constitution serves to decide whether an 
enactment is valid law within a society.42 In this article, constitutionalism entails a 
core set of norms, most particularly the rule of law, democratic legitimacy and a 
division of power which form the basis of a governance order within a constitutional 
legal system, these norms form the basis of constitutionalism, no matter the legal 
order on which it is situated and thus, must be present. 
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Constitutionalization, besides the international context, can be described as a 
process where a legal system goes from an ad hoc, decentralised, and consent based 
order to a system where the law regulates the exercise of power and governance. 
Constitutionalization advances the pre-constitutional legal order as it moves away 
from a structure where the holders of power are entirely self-regulated and beyond 
review to a system which provides a formulation where review may take place.43 As 
such constitutionalization can be considered to represent both a legal and political 
process. For the international legal order it would require an adoption of the norms 
of constitutionalism into the system until, over time, it becomes a fully functional 
constitutional order. This is not to suggest that international law will become 
politicised, but rather, that as a result of constitutionalization law will regulate most, 
though not all, holders of constituted power on a more consolidated basis than in a 
non-constitutionalised system.44  
 
Fundamentally, international constitutionalization proposes that elements of 
constitutionalism have, or will, become attributes of public international law 
detaching the state from its operation and recognising other agents or constituted 
power holders within the global governance system.45 Already many agents act 
without the legal or formal regulation of the state and while constitutionalization as 
a legal process will not capture all activity, particularly those in the informal sphere, 
international constitutionalization offers an opportunity to re-evaluate the 
limitations of historic state-based constitutionalism. Yet, the place of the state within 
constitutionalization theories is inconsistent and the theories which currently 
propose a process of constitutionalization have varying implications for the state; 
from cementing its place in the legal order to sidelining it as one among a variety of 
subjects of international law. Arguably, constitutionalization gradually progresses in 
stops and starts rather than a sudden ruptures of constitutional transformation. 
States ought to be considered dynamic actors in such a constitutionalization process 
whose role will, and potentially has already, evolved to become a lesser participant 
within a constitutionalised international order though not to the point of complete 
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dissipation.46 Thus it becomes necessary to consider what role, if any, a state may 
have within an international constitutional regime.  
 
Considering the impact of recognising a move away from a state-centred system of 
international law both Berman's discussion of non-state jurisdictional assertions 
limited by definitional relationships to the state and Teubner's societal 
constitutionalization recognise the significance of both the shift and over reliance on 
the state narrative within international law.47 Both views could lead to a conclusion 
that states are unnecessary in evaluating international law's future. But the state 
remains a mode of governance albeit amongst several, a significant point of 
contention for both pluralism and in a slightly different context, fragmentation.48 
Teubner's consideration of self-contained regimes as auto-constitutional emphasises 
the need to re-orientate the state within international law and more particularly for 
the purposes here, within international constitutionalization.49 Teubner's 
transnational constitutionalism highlights the inadequacies of disregarding the 
plurality of agencies within global governance, both public and private, for the state 
laden narratives of constitutionalism.50 
 
This article attempts to balance transnational constitutionalism and pluralist orders 
with a focus on the governance impact of the state.51 While acknowledging that 
other agents of constitutionalism - the traditional governance structures, the private 
sphere and societal fluxes - this article questions how international 
constitutionalism, if understood as maintaining a quintessential character, changes 
the nature of the state as other constituted power holders tussle for influence within 
the global governance order. 
 
De Wet contends that there is a move away from the state as the sole perpetrator of 
public decision-making as part of a much broader scheme where a core value system 
is supported by structures at national, regional, international and functional levels.52 
This account does not exclude the state from an international constitutional order 
but rather re-aligns the existing governance structures to broaden and re-assign 
decision making.53 When considering the place of the state in international 
constitutionalization the multitude of theories put forward appear contradictory. 
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Paulus suggests that international constitutionalization derives from a basis of 
recognised constitutional principles that up to recently was a focal point of domestic 
law. If the arguments in favour of domestic constitutionalism are comparable to 
those at the international level it would seem logical that it is acceptable to use 
similar principles when discussing constitutionalization as a movement within law as 
a whole.54 
 
In an attempt to rationalise the varying constitutionalization debates they are here 
divided into two groups; world order constitutionalization, and sectoral 
constitutionalization.55 While these two are not necessarily easy to segregate such a 
division does emphasise the differing forms of international constitutionalization and 
the varying implications of the process for the state. Both produce differing end 
results therefore the division between sectoral and world order constitutionalization 
are important to understand the place of the state in the constitutionalization 
process.  
 
While sectoral constitutional law is most often linked to institutional law it is actually 
much wider in its scope. Sectoral constitutionalization has two forms; one 
procedural and the second substantive. The procedural aspects are in the guise of 
the organisational structures while the substantive law emerges from a particular 
field of international law.56 Sectoral constitutionalization often centres upon 
constitutional institutional structures with a focus on organisations, such as the UN 
or the WTO. Alternatively it also may also concentrate on the normative values 
evolving within a particular area of international law, such as human rights. 
Procedural and substantive sectoral constitutionalization acknowledge the shift from 
a treaty to a more complex system which recognises the move of states as members 
and decision makers of institutions or legal structures to the institution itself as a 
separate legal actor. Although this change may not always be characterised as 
constitutional it is indicative of the challenges which international 
constitutionalization presents to states.  
 
World order constitutionalization considers international law to be one legal order 
based around a single process. It is a process of re-ordering Westphalian governance 
to a more sophisticated and hierarchal order. This does not require all of 
international law to become constitutional but rather certain aspects of the 
international legal order, as a pre-requisite, must become constitutional.57 World 
                                                 
54
 Andreas L. Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution in Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Jeffery L. Dunoff and Joel P. 
Trachtman eds 2009)  
55
 An alternative division proposed by Van Mulligen, splits constitutionalisation between indirect and 
direct arguments. Johannes Van Mulligen, Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the 
International Legal Order 24 Lei. J. Int’l L. 277, 279 – 280 (2011) 
56
 For example, within the WTO the substantive law is trade, within the UN the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
57
 Bardo Fassbender, We the Peoples of the United Nations’ Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form in International Law in The Paradox of Constitutionalism 273 (Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker 
eds. 2008) Andreas L. Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution in Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance 71 (Jeffery L. Dunoff and Joel P. 
Trachtman, eds. 2009)  
11 
 
order constitutionalization, like sectoral constitutionalization, comes in two guises. 
One side bases the changes firmly within the international legal order and adapts 
constitutionalism within this regime. The second centres the developments in 
international constitutionalization in constitutionalism as a concept (and not as an 
ideal) which assesses international law and identifies whether it has the necessary 
attributes to be constitutional.58 The state’s role in world order constitutionalization 
varies as the degree of change in its role fluctuates between theories.  
 
International constitutionalization is a process resulting in essential norms of 
constitutionalism becoming part of the international legal order. This can have a 
range of outcomes depending upon the basis on which constitutionalization is 
judged to be occurring. An aspect of the constitutionalization process and one which 
is at the core of the rest of this piece is the role of constitutional norms in changing 
the role of the state within international governance. Constitutional norms may have 
a multitude of implications for the state.59 The next section discusses, with particular 
reference to the state, the norms of constitutionalism which must be present or 
nascent in constitutionalization.  
 
A. Constitutionalism within Constitutionalization  
 
Arguably constitutionalism does not differ between the legal regimes it claims to 
order. This suggests that discussing constitutionalism as a model legal order, be it in 
the international, regional or international realm, should be relatively 
straightforward. Nonetheless, the use of constitutionalism in the international legal 
order is not without those who doubt its legitimate use. The arguments against the 
extension of constitutionalism to the international sphere are based upon 
understanding constitutionalism as intrinsically linked to the domestic legal order 
and suggestions that any transference outside of that realm is both illegitimate and 
illusory.60 
 
To maintain the same form of legal order two legal systems do not necessarily have 
to mirror each other. Certainly in domestic constitutionalism there are no two 
constitutions which are exactly alike.61 Yet, having made this claim there are norms 
associated with constitutionalism, for example, the rule of law, human rights, the 
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy, among others, which must be 
present. While there is a distinction between the underlying purposes of 
constitutionalism and the functional structure which accompanies its operation, if its 
aims is to substantiate a structure in which power is legitimately exercised, the 
question of the best system for this to occur within, be it an international, regional 
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or domestic framework, becomes vital.62 The legitimate exercise of constituent and 
constituted power is transposable to any level of constitutional configuration. 
Whereas a particular structure of governance may vary, it is the norms which 
underpin the aims of constitutional governance which must be present to assert that 
a governance order is or is becoming constitutionalised. 
 
Norms of constitutionalism are central to identifying a system of governance as 
constitutional. They are the basis on which a constitutional system operates and sets 
out whom the holders of power are, how they are chosen as well as more 
substantive detail.63 Norms of constitutionalism establish the relationship between 
the actors within a system. This is significant to the state as its role in an 
international constitutional system may vary depending on the demands of 
constitutionalism. This is the basis on which this discussion of the effect of 
international constitutionalization on the state is centred, with a footing within 
constitutionalism itself rather than a base in either international or domestic law. 
 
B. Norms of Constitutionalism  
 
To analyse the potential effect of constitutionalization on the state two 
constitutional norms are considered, the first is the separation of powers and the 
second democratic legitimacy. Obviously, this omits several other equally important 
norms of constitutionalism such as, among others, the rule of law and human rights, 
however, the choice of these two norms relates directly to the role of the state. 
Teubner's correctly asserts that constitutionalism outstrips the fetter between 
politics and law and while not disputing this claim, this nexus does not entirely 
dissipate and remains relevant.64 Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy 
rest upon this nexus and, as such, their relevance to the future of the state within 
global governance is potentially more marked than other constitutional norms since 
it their operation which funnels law and politics. The changes occurring within 
international law and the allocation of constituted power in any emergent 
separation of powers model impacts upon constitutional agents. Perhaps the most 
visible impact will be upon the state as it ensures a functioning divestment of power 
amongst legitimate agents. Thus how any new subjects of international law, as well 
as states, are divested of their power is a central concern of any move towards a 
constitutional structure. 
 
As representatives of individuals and as constituted power holders coupled with 
their interactions with each other, states' assumption of democratic legitimacy 
remains a difficult aspect of international law. Other potential constituted power 
holders, such as international organisations and individuals, must also be concerned 
with maintaining democratic legitimacy within the international legal order 
particularly since mandates for governance will become multi-situated as democratic 
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functionality evolves to recognise constituted power holders beyond and including 
states.65 As a norm of constitutionalism democratic legitimacy ensures that the 
holders of constituent power are able to exercise their warrant and participate in 
debate while the transformation brought about by constitutionalism requires 
democratic legitimacy to establish its functionality within a global constitutional 
order. If international constitutionalization is occurring it is essential to understand 
how democratic legitimacy will transform the state’s recognised role as the sole 
possessor of constituent and constituted power into another form to accommodate 
other actors.  
 
The following subsections consider the role of both the separation of powers and 
democratic legitimacy as norms of constitutionalism within an international 
constitutionalization process. Further it considers the impact the normative 
constitutional order will have upon the role of the state and the nexus between the 
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. This nexus, the rationale for which 
will be discussed, elevates the importance of both these particular norms for the role 
of state in an international constitutionalization process as their operation 
fundamentally shift the function and operation of the state within international 
governance.  
1. Separation of Powers  
  
Fundamentally, the separation of powers checks the exercise of constituted power. 
It divests power holders of their potential monopoly, dividing power amongst a 
number of constituted power holders ensuring a legitimate governance order 
operates as each constituted power holder oversees the exercise of power by 
another. Constituted power, the exercise of legitimate authority within a legal 
framework, is the basic currency of governance within a constitutional model and 
thus must not be held at a single point.66 Maintaining constituted power holders at 
different governance points ensures that collusion or consolidation of constituted 
power becomes more difficult. To do otherwise would concentrate power at one 
point and such a concentration of constituted power enables its possessors to 
dictate governance. While full functioning democratic legitimacy or the exercise of a 
constituted warrant may partly curtail over-reaching by constituted power holders, 
divestment further ensures that legitimate governance, in line with other 
constitutional norms and maintained by differentiated constituted power holders, is 
sustained. Such divestment also prevents democratic legitimacy from becoming a 
majoritarian orthodoxy67. 
 
The classic horizontal triumvirate of executive, legislature and judiciary is the most 
common example of divestment in action yet for a constitutional separation of 
powers to exist an exact model does not necessarily need to be present though its 
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utility within domestic legal order has been proven.68 Rather it is the attempt to 
ensure the exercise of power is checked by divestment which is paramount. Even 
domestic constitutionalism recognises alternatives to the classical triumvirate, the 
most obvious example being federal systems and the development of 
constitutionalism within the EU.69  
 
The place of separation of powers within international constitutionalization theories, 
be it in sectoral or world order constitutionalization, is not always apparent. For 
instance, whether it is the WTO’s or UN’s structure, the development of a jus cogens 
based order or some combination of both the divestment of power within an 
international constitutionalization does not always figure as a central normative 
value.70 Arguably, international constitutionalization necessitates an alternative to 
the horizontal separation of power structures recognised in domestic law but this 
also requires a reconsideration of the present international governance structure. 
 
As already discussed, international governance was traditionally best understood as 
rooted to the state yet this could not be characterised as a divestment of power. 
Some authors argue that there are networks and interactions within the global 
system which are not represented by the statist model. Habermas suggests 
governance occurs in a multilateral form but at present international law does not 
contain the ‘legislative competences and corresponding processes of political will 
formation’ which would be necessary in a fully-functioning constitutional order.71 
Constituted power, as situated at different points in international and the domestic 
governance, ensures that a shared structure of power is part of a constitutionalised 
legal order, this vertical form of separation of powers is key to this discussion. 
 
Several alternative models have emerged that seek to understand the role of the 
state within the separation of powers in international constitutionalism. One is the 
geographical separation of powers, a second is proposed by Cottier and Hertig and is 
based upon a five story house with governance at each level and a third form is 
proposed by Peters, namely a form of compensatory constitutionalism and finally 
there are those theories that consider differentiated power to be realised within a 
particular institutional order. This latter group is best described as sectoral 
constitutionalization while the former are more aligned with world order 
constitutionalization. The distinction between world order constitutionalization 
which relies on a wider separation of powers model and sectoral 
constitutionalization where it is identifiable in the institutional structures of bodies 
such as the UN and the WTO is evident. What is common to both forms of 
constitutionalization is the acknowledgement that it is at the transnational level 
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where the political system, constituted power and as such any separation of powers 
model should be considered to operate and not simply at the inter-state level. This 
illustrates the difficulty for international constitutionalization theories, the legitimacy 
of a governance regime which would comply with the norms of constitutionalism is 
difficult to identify in the present international legal order.  
 
The traditional horizontal separation of powers is bypassed and the focus shifted to 
an alternative basis for the divestment of constituted power. One such alternative is 
the geographical or vertical separation of powers which presents an interesting 
method of understanding the place of the state in international constitutionalization. 
In the vertical separation of powers governance occurs at different points, this can 
include local, regional, state, continental and global levels. Arguably this is already 
present in some federal models, in devolved states, or in the processes of integration 
such as within the EU.72 Loveland’s description incorporates two forms of separation 
of powers within his model; one horizontal and the other vertical.73 Loveland’s 
division of power differentiates between territorial centres which operate at 
separate levels of governance. Constituted power is divided vertically into 
geographical locations as well as in the classic horizontal triumvirate. For instance, in 
a federalised state power is located centrally, in the classic horizontally triumvirate, 
as well as vertically at the federal and state level.74 
 
Different functions of constituted power are performed at the local, federal, 
national, regional and international levels. Vertical separation of powers also 
introduces regulation of supervision into each layer of governance and as such 
establishes limits on the exercise of constituted power. While establishing the 
presence of a horizontal separation of powers may remain improbable in 
international law, a vertical separation of powers may provide a strong basis on 
which to balance the governance orders. The traditional state would be recognised 
as one level of governance, while its own internal federal or other model would 
represent another, its membership of regional and global organisations yet another. 
This necessarily would require that each level moderates the workings of the other. 
The EU for instance would be required to formalise its interactions with the UN, a 
process potentially underway following the line of Kadi decisions.75 At present, 
whether and how the Court of Justice should consider Security Council resolutions 
which it believes to have violated fundamental rights is unclear yet if the relationship 
was formalised it may provide a system of vertical separation of powers between the 
continental and international levels, particularly as the International Court of Justice 
has, thus far, rejected any judicial review power.76  
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Cottier and Hertig’s separation of powers model is based upon a ‘[f]ive story 
house.’77 Levels of governance are covered from the local level, through a federal 
system to the state and to a regional level and finally at the point of global 
governance. Each level maintains constitutional norms in its governance order. 
While all domestic systems are not necessarily federal; this proposal calls for at the 
very least two levels, the domestic and international, though ideally local, regional 
and continental layers would be added to the structure. This model does not require 
that each level mirror each other in content or structure.78 While the authors do not 
directly address this model to the necessity of separation of powers or the 
divestment of constituted power it is linked to the allocation and differentiation of 
power. 
 
Like, Loveland, Cottier and Hertig present a model where the divestment of power 
occurs along a vertical divide. In these theories, the issue for international 
constitutionalization becomes whether there is a move towards a unitary system 
with one horizontal or vertical separation of powers or whether a combination of 
both vertical and horizontal layers is necessary. Any of these options would not 
require a change in the form of state but rather a shift in the state from the centre of 
international law to a point where it is just one of the layers of power, still an 
important layer, but one which shares the international governance regime with 
other points of governance. 
 
In the alternate, Peters argues for a form of a compensatory constitutionalism.79 She 
suggests that a process of de-constitutionalization within states underpins a move 
away from the statist model of consent based international law. The fundamental 
norms present in an international constitutional order make up for any loss of 
authority by the state.80 Peters argues that the de-constitutionalization of the 
domestic sphere is or will be, filled by constitutionalization at the international level. 
While this re-construction of international law does not unavoidably result in the 
destruction of the state it certainly requires a realignment of governance powers 
into a differentiated separation of powers model. If international 
constitutionalization is to compensate for the ebbing away of state 
constitutionalism, then the interests that an ever stronger international constitution 
represents must be recognised. Conceivably state and international interests do not 
as easily transform from one to the other as is suggested within compensatory 
constitutionalism. 
 
In Peters’ model the representation of interests can move from the state to the 
international level. In this theory the same, or at the very least quite similar, forms of 
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constitutionalism are easily transposable and contemporaneously present within 
domestic and international law. This requires the dispersal of governance beyond 
the horizontal into a vertical stream that could theoretically shift as it develops in a 
different form of constitutional order. This opens up a number of possibilities for the 
state and the realisation of a separation of powers within international law. The 
dispersal of constituted power could be represented by differing governance 
competences at the state and international level. Yet, in Peters’ compensatory 
constitutionalism, while power is dispersed, there does not appear to be a system 
for one holder of power to be able to hold another to account. Peters regards the 
essential norms of the international legal system as the basis for constitutional 
functions. In practice, for Peters, judicial activism will realise these norms. Still, this 
necessitates a strong judicial arm to be present in compensatory constitutionalism to 
divest the holders of power of some of their authority. 
 
If, as Peters asserts, state constitutions no longer possess the totality of governance, 
this suggests at some previous point states had absolute control. This is an absolutist 
Westphalian model and assumes that states had ‘total constitutions’.81 Secondly, 
and most significantly from the perspective of this investigation it remains a state 
based constitutional regime which is pushed up and compensated for at the global 
level.82 This does not present a system for the divestment of constituted power 
among different points of governance other than what a state would consent to, and 
as such does not represent a radical change from the current international legal 
order. Nor does it establish a fully formed separation of powers model. 
 
Loveland's, Cottier and Hertig’s and Peters' proposals present reasoned basis for 
understanding how the separation of powers may be understood beyond the 
horizontal model to where the unitary state no longer takes centre stage as the 
ultimate authority.83 The models suggested by both Loveland and Cottier and Hertig 
imply that there is no specific minimum required to establish a ‘true’ separation of 
powers. Ultimately, the separation of powers divides constituted power and as such 
may be horizontal, horizontal and vertical and potentially only vertical. There is no 
“perfect” system. The aims of the separation of powers may be achieved through a 
number of structures, but the divestment of power remains a central norm which 
must subsist at the end of a process of constitutionalization.  
 
The shift towards the vertical divestment model raises issues regarding hierarchy 
and structure. The relative fluidity of the system coupled with the entrenchment of 
democratic legitimacy at each level goes some way to prevent the entrenchment of 
a subordinating system nonetheless such a possibility must be borne in mind 
particularly as the vertical model moves beyond the state and the state itself 
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becomes part of a broader structure.84 Such concerns are eruditely discussed by 
Krisch proffering a heterarchical structure as an alternate to constitutionalist 
proposals.85 Krisch proposes a reliance on norms to ensure that hierarchical 
domination does not establish itself. Kumm's alternative, where different points of 
governance operate within a strong normative structure arguably answers some of 
Krisch's concerns.86 For the state, Kumm's approach maintains the state as a point of 
governance but also diffuses this exercise of constituted power to other sites within 
a normative constitutional model. Such an approach recognises the entirety of the 
operation of constitutionalism and the necessary interaction of each substantive 
norm, for example, separation of power tempers democratic legitimacy and vice 
versa. 
 
In considering the move from a statist regime and the concentration on the 
relationship with domestic constitutionalism, international constitutionalization 
theories have encapsulated the notion that governance occurs at multiple levels, 
that the holders of constituted power do not have to be at the same level of 
governance and that the separation of powers should be present in any debate on 
the process of constitutionalization. Nonetheless an alternate approach also subsists 
within constitutionalization debates which suggest that the actual models of 
separation of powers regimes are found within international institutions.  
 
One such approach is to recognise the importance of institutional regimes already 
present in international law. Simma argues that the UN Charter is an ‘embryonic 
constitution of the world community.’87 Linking international constitutionalism to 
domestic constitutionalism, Simma argues that the similarities between the two 
include a traditional if extremely truncated separation of powers.88 This excludes a 
normative approach to constitutionalism. It also excludes a debate on whether the 
UN can be argued to have a separation of powers structure and if it is found that it 
has, what this should imply about the present governance structure within the 
organisation. Relying heavily on the domestic and horizontal elements of 
constitutionalism, Simma, in seeking to identify constitutional forms, limits the 
possibilities available to international constitutionalism and as such limits the 
potential for the state within an international constitutional order. These limitations 
are also present in the work of Fassbender, who recognises the UN Charter as a 
constitution for the international community, but again in doing so confirms the 
existent failures of this organisation and the role of the state as focal point of 
international governance into the international legal order. These models of 
separation of powers are not reliant on constitutionalism as a starting point of 
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debate, rather this form of constitutionalization centres on the emulation of the 
domestic realm.89  
 
These institutional positions suggest that there is a subsisting separation of powers 
model which would stand a test of constitutionalism. Yet, a fully considered 
reflection on the institutional arrangements suggests that the separation of powers 
does not appear to subsist or operate in line with understood constitutional norms. 
Naturally, differentiating between the impacts this actually has for international 
constitutionalization is not within this discussion, it does bear pointing out that 
currently international institutions would fall far short of establishing a separation of 
powers model which succeeds in moving the state from its position as the sole 
subject of international law and the holder of constituted power. 
 
In a process of international constitutionalization the state cannot maintain its place 
as the sole holder of constituted power, particularly as international organisations 
assert authoritative control. Ultimately the separation of powers necessitates a 
substantial recognition of the shift in the balance of power within international law 
and the recognition that at the very least regional and global organisations could 
also be considered to be constituted power holders. Should constitutionalization 
actually occur within international law the state will be replaced at the centre of 
international decision and law making. This is not a claim that the state will be 
entirely removed from the international legal order, as Schachter has commented, 
the state is resilient, but rather that it will have to give way in a differentiated system 
of governance.90 Nonetheless, such a shift must be concert with other constitutional 
norms, such as the one next discussed, as each are reliant on the other function 
within a constitutional governance regime. 
 
2. Democratic Legitimacy  
 
According to Llanque, whereas a constitution is static, ‘[d]emocracy is the dynamic 
element in constitutional democracies.’91 Democracy is entrenched as the ideal and 
most justifiable form of governance at the state level.92 The necessary force of 
constituent power is missing from any system where democracy is absent.93 One of 
the consistent debates within both general international legal governance and 
institutional law is the subsisting democratic deficit.94 Indeed Wheatley goes so far 
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as to call democracy a ‘neglected concept’ in international law.95 In an international 
constitutionalization process the question for the state becomes whether internal 
democratic process are enough to satisfy constitutional norms, if these are not 
entrenched in states what impact this has for constitutionalization beyond its 
borders and whether some form of international democracy must take hold to 
before a process of constitutionalization can be said to begin.  
 
Democracy is not a monolithic ideal, it may be divided between direct and 
representative democracy yet to establish legitimacy arguably democracy must have 
some substantive form within a legal order.96 Democracy that is too remote from the 
actual governance structure, which arguably is the case within international law and 
which is entirely reliant on domestic democratic institutions, is not attaining the 
minimum standard necessary in constitutionalism potentially establishing a 
substantive barrier to international constitutionalization's entrenchment beyond the 
state. Participative democracy is preferred in an ideal constitutional order as it does 
not regard democracy as merely majoritarianism. Simple majorities disenfranchise 
some constituent power holders and prevents the deliberation necessary to ensure 
conflict is resolved.97 Norms of constitutionalism also ensure that democracy is 
neither too remote nor bound to simple majoritarianism. The separation of powers, 
the rule of law together with democratic legitimacy ensures that a constitutional 
governance order is maintained. Nonetheless, remoteness may be the key 
differentiator between international and other forms of constitutional 
entrenchment.  
 
Legitimacy is as important as democracy in establishing a constitutional structure, 
indeed democracy forms part of a legitimate order. While legitimacy is at times 
equated with popular opinion (or majoritiarianism) within constitutionalism this 
should be rejected as inadequate.98 Legitimacy is also associated with transparency. 
For instance, Rehfeld suggests that transparency is necessary for constituent power 
holders to accept the legitimacy of the actions of the constituted power holders. The 
opinion of the constituent power holders, the justification and transparency of 
action contribute to establishing the legitimacy necessary for a democratic system to 
fully function, thus democracy and legitimacy are intertwined as the latter cannot be 
established in a constitutional order without the former. 
 
Democratic legitimacy maintains the link between the holders of constituent power 
and those who exercise constituted power; it ensures that power is exercised in a 
transparent and justifiable manner and inculcates a process for the removal of 
constituted power in situations where the holders of such power no longer have the 
support of the constituent power holders. This is indispensable to a constitutional 
order and as such to international constitutionalization process. 
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For a constitutional order to fully deploy the norms of constitutionalism it must be 
regarded as democratic. To ensure the integrity of the system other essential 
elements of constitutionalism, such as the rule of law and separation of powers, 
must also fully function on a legitimate basis. Constitutionalism and democratic 
legitimacy are bound together as any legitimate change to the constitution, besides 
revolution, can only take place through a democratic process.99 While the 
representative or direct democratic ideals of constitutionalism may be pitted against 
each other, the pull of democracy and constitutionalism, arguably settle the 
opposing views to the extent that is necessary to establish democratic legitimacy 
within a system.100 
 
Within international constitutionalization theories ‘possible democracy’ is at times 
identified within a process where constitutionalism is being established.101 
Democracy’s inclusion in the international constitutionalization debate, even if it is 
ultimately dismissed, indicates that it cannot be ignored. A very basic argument is 
that democratic states participating in international governance, once the legal order 
enables these states to participate on a legitimate basis, is enough to establish 
democracy within international law. Yet, this does not adequately address a number 
of concerns. First, the role that non-democratic states play within international law, 
second, the remoteness of states, democratic or otherwise from decision-making 
structures, third, the voting structures of the main international organisations which 
do not allow for full democratic practice, fourth, the manner in which international 
law is created, particularly custom, not always enabling equal participation and 
finally the relative power of certain states to participate within the process of 
international governance. All of these objections are besides the questionable 
position that states would legitimately represent the constituent power holders 
within an international constitutional regime. 
  
Regarding undemocratic states, arguably without their democratisation, even if 
global democratic systems were established within an international separation of 
powers or divestment model with all that this must entail including; legitimacy, 
transparency and participation, these undemocratic points of governance would be 
enough to hamper full constitutionalization. This, in turn, renders pointless any 
pursuit of a democratic international legal order while some states remain 
undemocratic. Yet, incremental constitutionalization may in itself further the 
democratic cause within states. The spread of democracy since the end of the Cold 
War,102 the inculcation of democracy into Security Council Resolutions,103as well as 
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into doctrines such as the responsibility to protect together with its place as a 
human right, goes some way to inculcating it as essential to the international legal 
order.104 Democracy's embedding into states raises the possibility that 
democratisation could occur alongside constitutionalization, though the latter 
remains incomplete while the former continues unrealised and will formation 
incoherent. 
 
Even in instances where states are fully democratic the constituted power holders 
within that state are bound to the constituent power holders within that state. To be 
fully democratically legitimate within the state, the state must always only act in the 
state’s interest and ought not to take extraneous considerations into account. This 
limitation stifles the state as the sole constituent power holder within an 
international constitutionalization process and establishes the need to reconsider 
the place of the state within international governance. The difficulties created by 
such remoteness can only be rectified through the establishment of democratic will 
formation at all points of governance within the international legal order. Wheatley's 
cosmopolitan democracy identifies the need to reallocate 'political authority to 
ensure the participation of all those affected in processes of democratic will 
formation.'105 In doing so Wheatley recognises that often the lesser peaks of isolated 
democratisation within individual governance structures such as international 
institutions are considered in the international democratisation context.106 Certainly, 
within the international constitutionalization debate, thus far, this lesser form of 
democracy appears the height of ambition.107 Tackling remoteness and, as such, the 
democratisation of all points of governance needs incorporation into international 
constitutionalization. 
 
Several differing positions within the constitutionalization debate create a picture of 
the place of democracy within these theories and also reflects the wider issues that 
international law, beyond constitutionalization, has with democratic practice. De 
Wet acknowledges the importance of democracy, but as a human right to be 
enforced domestically and presupposes that domestic constitutionalism satisfies the 
need for democratic legitimacy in international law sidestepping governance beyond 
the state and issues of remoteness.108 From De Wet's perspective little change is 
thus required in the state’s current role. Yet, as just discussed it highly questionable 
as to whether this would satisfy the requirements of normative constitutionalism. 
Democratic participation of all the subjects of international law requires a model 
which goes much further than relying on states to internally establish democratic 
legitimacy; it also leaves open the question of whether, if De Wet is correct, all states 
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would have to be democratic before constitutionalization could progress to become 
a full constitutional order. Indeed while it may be argued by some that the process 
of constitutionalization will itself further support democratisation within states but 
this can only occur if democratisation is incorporated into the process.109 
 
Habermas makes democratic legitimacy a point of departure for all theories of 
constitutionalization and points to the lack of democracy in international law as 
critical to the debate.110 Further, he suggests that those that question the necessity 
of democratic legitimacy within international constitutionalization but still advocate 
recognising an existent constitutionalism are writing-off democracy from the global 
constitutional order. For Habermas, this disregard for democracy stems from 
perceiving international law as never actually or potentially being democratic. This 
would suggest that democracy’s absence must be accepted as the fundamental 
difference between domestic and international constitutionalism.111 Arguably, such a 
fundamental differentiation puts the international governance order beyond 
constitutionalism and perhaps beyond any governance regime which good rightly be 
called legitimate, a point of ignominy for international law. 
 
Habermas argues that the identification of a transnational space is necessary to 
enable the legitimisation of a political constitution. This requires the establishment 
of democratic models of institutional orders and highlights the difficulties present in 
theories of international governance; identifying the mass to which a constitutional 
order is attached and as such giving consideration to enabling the exercise of the 
democratic warrant held by constituent power holders to ensure will formation. If, 
as Habermas argues, the subjects of world constitutionalism are individuals and 
states, or beyond this if international organisations were to be included, state’s 
current monopolisation of representation does not satisfy the needs of 
constitutionalism.112 In fact, accepting other subjects within the international legal 
order, such as states and individuals, as well as other potential subjects such as 
international organisations in the maintenance of the legal order is perhaps a more 
realistic proposition than ignoring their participation and declaring democratic 
legitimacy impossible.  
 
Habermas' position is certainly to be preferred to those that argue for an existent 
constitutionalism which either accepts the status quo of or alternatively presses the 
state's demise too far. State’s interests are just that, they represent the domestic 
constituent power holders' interests in the states, while they may have legitimate 
force within the state themselves, with regard global interests, they form a part, but 
not the entirety of the necessary interests to be accounted for in a constitutional 
order, their remoteness excluding their monopolisation. Democratic legitimacy, 
within international constitutionalization theories, is inconsistent. While currently, 
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most constitutionalization theories appear to mainly consist of state based processes 
with little regard to the establishment of community interests through any 
democratic process, there is generally recognition that democracy must play a role. 
Those theories remain reliant upon a state-centric view of how democracy can be 
established within a constitutionalization process but must recognise that for 
democratic legitimacy to be established the state cannot be the sole constituent 
power holder. 
 
International constitutionalization potentially pushes democratisation forward, both 
internally to the state and beyond at other points of governance within the 
international legal order but as they are both inter-reliant, democratisation must 
also have its own propulsion. The coupling of these two elements creates a 
fundamental issue for those constitutionalists that argue for present 
constitutionalism. Even those that limit constitutionalization to sectors or 
organisations must still contend with undemocratic states which remain a bar even if 
these sectors or organisation themselves become democratic. This note of caution is 
not to suggest the impossibility of either democratisation or constitutionalization but 
rather presents a basis for discussion of how either may be achieved in concert with 
each other. 
 
C. Norms of Constitutionalism and the State 
 
What impact would the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy have upon 
the international legal order? A simple answer, based upon some of the more 
conservative constitutionalization theories, is very little. Yet, international 
constitutionalization, if based on existent international law including the place of 
states, individuals, and international organisations requires more than recognition of 
the present international order as constitutional, as the foregoing analysis has 
established the norms of constitutionalism requires some change in the traditional 
understandings of the state's role within the international legal order. 
 
An alternative route, and the one that is proposed here, is that the process of 
constitutionalization within international law should be recognised as an ongoing 
process of reform. From this stance, it can be accepted that the norms of 
constitutionalism do not necessarily have to present for the process itself to be 
underway. Therefore it can be acknowledged that there is an absence of a 
separation of powers which would truly restrain and differentiate between the 
power holders within international law. It can also be recognised that democratic 
legitimacy is presently lacking within international law, and while establishing it may 
be difficult its absence is detrimental to any claim to an existing fully 
constitutionalised system. 
 
Crucially, these two norms of constitutionalism, among others, must be nascent or at 
the very least potentially present, in some form for constitutionalization to be 
described as being underway and must come to fruition to enable the international 
legal order to become constitutionalised. But before this occurs the place of the 
state within the international legal must be re-considered. Evidently the traditional 
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Westphalian international law, did not, nor did it intend to, ensconce itself in 
democracy or the separation of powers and thus it must be left behind to establish a 
constitutional model which is based around constitutional norms. 
 
The separation of power requires the state to step back from being the sole subject 
of international law and take a place alongside other points of governance. If a 
vertical model of the separation of powers were to be accepted, and became part of 
layered system of constituted power holders, this would fundamentally change the 
position of the state in the international governance order. Arguably, this is already 
occurring with the advent of supranational bodies such as the EU, however, other 
levels of governance must be recognised as on a par with state constituted power to 
fully entrench the separation of powers. This does not dismantle the state, but 
rather recognises that it must be re-imagined in a new context in line with other 
constitutional norms to ensure its proper operation. 
 
Democratic legitimacy requires that all constituent power holders’ interests be 
recognised. Again, this does not require the entire displacement of the state, but 
rather a movement away from the assumption that the state entirely represents the 
interests of all those within its borders, particularly when those states are 
undemocratic. Further, it must be acknowledged that the interests of the 
international legal order, international organisations and NGOs are different and 
must also be accounted for within a constitutional arrangement. The mechanics by 
which this may be achieved are most evident in the changing nature of some 
international institutions as well as the changes in participation of stakeholders, the 
institutions themselves and international officers such as the UN Secretary General. 
This does not mean that the state is entirely excluded, but as with the separation of 
powers, to establish a constitutional order the needs of democratic legitimacy must 
be satisfied and to ensure its proper operation, as with the separation of powers, it 
must be guaranteed alongside other constitutional norms.  
4. Conclusion  
 
Constitutionalization does not necessarily provide an answer to all the difficulties 
relating to the place of the state in present international law, indeed it may only 
attract more questions rather than answers. Yet, constitutionalism sets out 
parameters which would remedy some of the problems presented by the change in 
the status of the state within international law particularly its place as a point of 
governance and the requirements of democratic legitimacy. 
 
Constitutionalization within international law will not create Shangri La. Within 
states it does not achieve such a result. Recognised within many international 
constitutionalization theories are the incoherencies in international law which 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the international legal order is not a fully 
constituted system. Yet the task of constitutionalism must be more than creating a 
coherent legal order. For instance, regarding the place of the state in international 
law constitutionalism provides an analytical tool for understanding the gaps which 
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persist in the international legal order and offers potential methods of filling such 
fissures. 
 
Constitutionalization will, however, profoundly affect the role of the state within the 
international legal order. The role of state is already in a state of flux, and 
constitutionalization and the norms which accompany the process offer a potential 
resolution to some of the issues related to governance while also setting out a 
possible alternative legal order. Within an international constitutional order the 
state would have to give way to other bases of power. 
 
Separation of powers would require the recognition that power must be held 
beyond the state, but also that there must be some form of check on state power 
beyond what presently exists within international law. Democratic legitimacy 
requires that interests beyond those presented by states must be accounted for in 
the decision making processes of the international legal order and the continued 
existence of undemocratic states causes real difficulties in claiming any legitimate 
system is operational. These challenges do not necessarily require a world 
parliament or government but rather some form of engagement of all interests in 
the international legal order. 
 
While separation of powers and democratic legitimacy are only two of a potential 
large number of constitutional norms that would become substantiated in an 
international constitutional order, they do represent two of the most compelling 
challenges to the role of the state in international law. In an international 
constitutional order the state would have to give way to the other subjects of 
international law and integrate into a system which would no longer accept its 
supremacy. Constitutionalization, both as a potential process or reform and as a 
tried and tested governance order offers a system which utilises the states position 
to its fullest extent while accepting its limitations.  
